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Abstract. Database users have started moving toward the use of cloud computing 
as a service because it provides computation and storage needs at affordable 
prices. However, for most of the users, the concern of privacy plays a major role 
as they cannot control data access once their data are outsourced, especially if the 
cloud provider is curious about their data. Data encryption is an effective way to 
solve privacy concerns, but executing queries over encrypted data is a problem 
that needs attention. In this research, we introduce a bit-based model to execute 
different relational algebra operators over encrypted databases at the cloud with-
out decrypting the data. To encrypt data, we use the randomized encryption al-
gorithm (AES-CBC) to provide the maximum-security level. The idea is based 
on classifying attributes as sensitive and non-sensitive, where only sensitive at-
tributes are encrypted. For each sensitive attribute, the table’s owner predefines 
the possible partition domains on which the tuples will be encoded into bit vectors 
before the encryption. We store the bit vectors in an additional column in the 
encrypted table in the cloud. We use those bits to retrieve only part of encrypted 
records that are candidates for a specific query. We implemented and evaluated 
our model and found that the proposed model is practical and success to minimize 
the range of the retrieved encrypted records to less than 30% of the whole set of 
encrypted records in a table. 
Keywords: Cloud Security, Cloud Databases, Encrypted Data, Query Pro-
cessing, Searchable Encryption, Encrypted Databases 
1 Introduction 
Nowadays, cloud computing is an attractive computation environment for both individ-
uals and organizations since it provides a scalable data storage and high-performance 
computing unites. These features were not affordable for most individuals and small 
companies; so previously, only big companies could own such unites. With the pres-
ence of cloud computing, this problem has been solved as users can rent storage and 
computation unites as needed at an affordable price. Moreover, the majority of cloud 
providers offer database as a service, in which users and companies outsource their data 
and can access them anytime, from anywhere. However, people have expressed concern 
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about their privacy when outsourcing sensitive data, as privacy breaches are one of the 
most common threats in the cloud-computing environment. For example, untrustworthy 
cloud providers can steal personal customer information such as emails, addresses, and 
phone numbers and sell them to third parties. Thus, users receive annoying advertise-
ments through emails, the mail, and their phones. Furthermore, if an attack targets a 
cloud provider, the attackers can gain access to customers’ sensitive personal infor-
mation such as their social security numbers (SSNs). This has serious consequences, as 
the criminals can impersonate customers in different situations such as financial trans-
actions like phone banking. As a result, sensitive data are restricted from being pro-
cessed or sold to a third party. Therefore, the cloud-computing environment could be-
come unattractive for consumers if there are no available appropriate solutions for pri-
vacy breach and security issues. This issue must be addressed if cloud providers are to 
gain the trust of users and organizations so that they will outsource their sensitive data 
without worrying about data leakages. 
 To solve the problem of privacy breach, data encryption is the only way to ensure 
that cloud providers cannot learn from the data they store. Different researchers have 
proposed various models for user-side data encryption, wherein data encryption hap-
pens before outsourcing, and decryption happens on the user’s side. The problem with 
this technique is that it conflicts with critical functionalities of cloud environments (e.g., 
searching for a numeric range of data). Other researchers use what is called onion layer 
encryption where each data item is encrypted with more than one encryption algorithm 
to support various query types [24]. However, in case of huge data sets, the penalty is 
the computational burden, as each data item might have to be decrypted more than once. 
 In this proposed research, we design a model to execute different relational algebra 
queries over encrypted data. The proposed model deals with both encrypted numeric 
data and textual data. We introduce the query manager (QM) component—light soft-
ware for single users and a trusted server in organizations—which performs the encryp-
tion, decryption, and queries translation, leaving a minimal amount of work for users. 
In addition, in our model, we split the computation into two sides: a cloud provider side 
and a client side, where we move the majority of the computation to the cloud provider 
by translating queries into appropriate ways to deal with encrypted data without de-
crypting them. We design an algorithm for each query category (e.g., select, join, union, 
intersection, etc.) to enable cloud providers to execute such query categories over en-
crypted tuples. Further, we encrypt sensitive data in tables with the randomized Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES-CBS) encryption algorithm that is neither determin-
istic (each plaintext always has the same cipher text) nor order preserving in order to 
provide the highest level of security and privacy.  
We classify attributes to sensitive and non-sensitive. Sensitive attributes can be par-
titioned into partition domains (PDs) by the owner of the table based on possible values 
for the attribute. The query manager (QM) creates a data structure for the partitions 
domains (PDs), and then creates a bit vector whose length is equal to the number of 
PDs and maps each PD to a bit position. The encrypted table in the cloud will have an 
additional column to store those bits for each tuple. We use those bits to retrieve only 
candidate encrypted tuples of a query from the cloud. Also, we make our model re-
sistances to different attacks, such as inference attack, that could happen at the cloud 
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site where the attacker could exploit the presence of the bits to infer the possible data 
distributions. The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we discuss 
related work and previous models. Then, in section 3, we explain the model in detail. 
We describe how we implemented and evaluated our model in section 4, and we pro-
vide the conclusions of this work in section 5. 
2 Literature Review 
CryptDB is a system proposed by Popa et al. [23] as the first practical system for 
executing different Standard Query Language (SQL) queries over the encrypted data-
bases. The model was designed to resist two different possible attacks, cloud attacks, 
and proxy attacks. They introduce onion layers encryption that is encrypting each data 
item by more than one encryption algorithm to support multiple SQL queries. Moreo-
ver, they present new algorithms, including one to handle the join operation. In 
CryptDB, the primary purpose of the proxy is to perform the crypto processes on be-
have of the users. One of the downsides of CryptDB is the high computation burden 
because each data item must be encrypted and decrypted more than once. 
Liu et al. in [17] propose the FHOPE system to support complex SQL queries over 
encrypted data while resisting homomorphic order-preserving attacks. It allows cloud 
providers to run arithmetic and comparison operators over encrypted data without re-
peating the encryption. The limitation of this work is that the authors conducted their 
experiments based on tables with less than 9,000 records. In order to show the effi-
ciency and scalability of the system, using tables with larger numbers of records (e.g., 
100,000; 500,000; and 1,000,000) would better in terms of assisting the efficiency and 
overhead since this requires more decryption processes. A variety of studies related to 
this system can be found at [7,8,16,18,19,24,30]. 
Cui et al. propose P-McDb [3], a privacy-preserving search system that enables users 
to run queries over encrypted data. It uses two clouds to prevent inference attacks, one 
for data storing and searching and one for database re-randomizing and shuffling. It 
supports partial searches of encrypted records (as opposed to total searches), a feature 
referred to as a sub-linear manner. P-McDb can be used by multiple users, and in the 
case of a user revocation, the data cannot be re-encrypted. In this system, the commu-
nication between the two clouds could introduce more delays when compared with 
other systems, like [23]. Other proposed models in this matter are described in [2,4,5,6, 
13,32]. 
In [10], the authors have created a system that executes relational algebra operators 
over encrypted data. They add identifiers for attributes to enable service providers to 
execute queries over data. They split the computation between the end user and the 
service provider, with the majority of the computation moved to the service provider’s 
side. The limitation of this work is that each tuple is encrypted and stored as a string at 
the service provider’s site. This prevents some of the relational algebra operators (e.g., 
projection) from being executed on the provider’s side, and in some cases, whole en-
crypted tuples must be returned and decrypted (see [9,14,15,22] for related research). 
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Osama et al., in [21], propose different approaches for partitioning attributes of ta-
bles into multiple domains. They tested their approaches and found that they introduced 
different delays. Their approaches are based on an order-preserving mapping function, 
which enables cloud servers to execute different operators as equality operators. The 
limitation of this work is that they did not consider textual data in their experiments, 
which would prove that their approaches are practical for relational databases. They 
should also have considered relational algebra operators. 
In [27], the authors proposed SDB that is a model based on dividing data to sensitive 
and non-sensitive data; only sensitive data are encrypted. The idea is to split the sensi-
tive data into two shares, one share is kept by the data owner (DO) and the second is 
kept by the service provider (SP) assuming the SP is untrusted. In SDB, the SP cannot 
reveal anything from the share that it has. Besides, the SDB allows different operators 
to share the same encryption, providing secure query processing with data interopera-
bility. Similar work can be found in [20, 31, 28]. 
Bucketization is a method that requires the indexing and partitioning of the en-
crypted data into more than one bucket. Each bucket has an identification (ID) and 
holds a set of encrypted records ranging from the minimum to maximum value. The 
index can be used to execute SQL-style queries over the encrypted data [26]. Various 
models have been done based on this approach [11, 12, 25, 29]. 
3 The Model 
The main goal of this research is to design a model that protects data in cloud servers 
from being accessed by curious cloud providers or malicious attackers. Each database 
table in this model will be encrypted before being outsourced to the cloud, using the 
randomized encryption algorithm, AES-CBC; concurrently, we enable the cloud server 
to execute queries over the encrypted data. Unlike traditional database encryption mod-
els where the user is the one who encrypts and decrypts the data, as in our previous 
work [1], our model uses a query manager (QM) as an intermediary between users and 
the cloud. As shown in Fig. 1, our model features the QM as a light software for single 
users or a trusted server that resides in the private cloud, for users within organizations. 
We design the QM to perform the computations, creating minimal work for the user(s). 
In the following sub-sections, we explain the model in detail. 
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3.1 The Details of the Proposed Model 
We divide the attributes into sensitive and non-sensitive attributes. The sensitive attrib-
utes are the only attributes that are encrypted; because if they are not, they would leak 
private information, whereas non-sensitive attributes do not leak private information. 
We classified sensitive attributes, where data must be encrypted, into two types: attrib-
utes that have limited distinct values, such as student_rank, and attributes that may have 
too many distinct values (ranges), such as salary. Therefore, each attribute is partitioned 
into multiple partitions, and the table’s owner is the one who predefines these partitions 
before beginning the encryption process. Then the QM builds a data structure of all 
partitions for each table, as in Fig. 2. After that, the QM creates a bit vector (BV) for 
each record where its length equals the total number of partitions for all the sensitive 
attributes. Then we store those bits in an additional attribute(s) in the encrypted table at 
the cloud, unlike our previous work [1] where we store bit vector(s) in the QM. We use 
the bits to retrieve only candidate encrypted tuples for a query and element unrelated 
tuples retrieval. The QM performs the following steps for creating bit vectors (BVs) 
and encrypting tuples: 1) The table’s owner defines partitions domains for each sensi-
tive column and sends a creation request to the QM. 2) According to the PDs, the QM 
creates a data structure for the table to easily translate queries in the future.3) The QM 
takes each record j and creates a bit vector BVj whose length is equal to the total number 
of partition domains for all sensitive columns for a table T, map each bit’s position to 
a single domain partition, and initializes all bits with 0’s. 4) A bit i in BVj is set if and 
only if the data item d under column A equals or belongs to partition domain Ai. 5)  The 
QM shall encrypt sensitive columns’ data by AES-CBC and send encrypted data to the 
 
Fig. 1. System architecture 
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Table 1.  Students Table 
ID Name Rank Visa type Department 
110 Alice freshman F1 Computer science 
111 Sara senior J1 Computer engineering 
112 John junior None Information system 
113 Ryan Sophomore J2 Math 
 
cloud database, along with the BVj from the previous step. 6) The steps above are re-
peated for all records in Table T. In the cloud, the encrypted table has an additional 
column (we call it the reference column) to keep a BV for each record. The data type 
of the reference column that stores BVs is a BIT(n), where n is the number of bits. So, 
we don’t worry about the size growth of the BVs since they are in bits and stored at the 
cloud. Do the fact that bits attributes can hold up to 64 bits, we could have more than 
one attribute to store bits. Then when rewriting the query, the QM can take the bits 
position find the reminder of 64 (e.g. when the bit position is 80, then 80%64 =16 which 
means the bit’s position in the second bits attributes is 16). In this way, we can exploit 
the high computation speed and the massive capacity provided by the cloud to process 
and store BVs. The longer the BVs are, the less encrypted records are retrieved.  
Security of proposed model. Although it’s not an easy process for an adversary (either 
malicious attacker or curios cloud provider) to learn the distribution of data nor infer 
the possible values of a column from the BVs, we add another security step to address 
this vulnerability. The solution is based on encrypting the names of the tables and the 
sensitive columns by a deterministic encryption algorithm, namely AES-SIV, where 
the ciphertexts for each plain text are always identical. The reason for that is to maxim-
ize the security to the highest level by making it impossible for the adversary to infer 
or learn from the BVs column the possible values while we enable the cloud provider 
to execute our queries. For instance, the column “Students-Rank” have limited possible 
values like grad, senior, junior, etc. Then the adversary could infer those even though 
they are encrypted with AES-CBC (which always produces different ciphertexts for a 
plain text). Details and security analysis of AES-SIV can be found in [33]. Note that, 
having more than ciphertexts share the same prefix is a not concern since the adversary 
cannot get the plain text unless he obtains the SK (Secrete key), and the SK isn’t passed 
to the cloud in our case. Therefore, by encrypting the names of tables and sensitive 
columns, we ensure that the adversary can learn nothing from the BVs that we store at 
the cloud. 
Example. Suppose we want to encrypt the students table presented in Table 1: the QM 
encrypts the table name and the names of sensitive columns by AES-SIV using user’s 
secret key (SK) and create a new table at the cloud. Then the QM takes the first record 
and parses it to get the values. The name is “Alice,” where the first letter is “A,” which 
falls under the range “A–F,” so the bit in the position 219 = 524288 will be set to 1. 
Then, the rank is “freshman”, that will set the bit that mapped to position 215 to 1. Next, 
the visa type is “F1,” so QM sets bit with position 210 to 1;  the same process occurs for 
the department column,  which will set position  25 to 1.  Now,  the bit vector (BV) is  
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Fig. 2. Data structure and mapping information at the QM for student table. 
“10001000010000100000”. The QM will do this for all the records in the table. The 
encrypted table in the cloud will look like Table 2. To retrieve encrypted data from the 
encrypted table, when a user submits a query to the QM as  
“select name from student where department = “computer science” 
The QM processes the query as in follow: 
1) The QM encrypt the table’s name and the sensitive columns’ names using the 
user’s SK to obtain the cipher texts as below: 
CT1 =  EAES-SIV (“Students”, SK)  
CT2 =  EAES-SIV (“Name”, SK)  
2) The QM looks up the data structure, finds the bits’ representations, then re-
writes the query as “select CT2 from CT1 where reference&32 > 0” 
3)  The cloud will return only encrypted tuples that have the bit at position 32 
(25) = 1.  
 
3.2 Condition Rewriting 
To enable the cloud database server (CDBS) to search over encrypted data, the QM 
must translate the query conditions in ways that the CDBS can implement them over 
encrypted tuples. This is a very important step before implementing queries of any 
query category, such as joins, union, and aggregations. The QM translates queries based 
on the data structures (DSs) of the table(s) involved in the query. As in [9], we have 
three kinds of conditions: 
1. A condition that has a column and a value, for example, 
Name = “Alice”. 
2. A condition that has columns only, such as Name = Name. 
3. A condition that involves more than one condition, such as Name= “Alice” OR visa 
type = “F1”.  
In the first and second kinds, there are five possible operations {>, <, =,  ≥,  ≤ }. The 
operation in the third kind is limited to {V, ⌐, ꓥ}. In the first kind, column and value, 
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the QM parses the query to extract the table’s name, columns, and values. Then, for 
each value v, the QM finds the partition domain PDi that value v equals or belongs to, 
and keeps its position. If the operation is “=”, then it is straightforward, and the QM 
substitutes values with its corresponding bit position. We explain this case in detail 
under selection operation in the next sub-section. If the operation is “> or ≥”, then the 
QM finds the positions of all PDs that are less than v. Therefore, the QM translates the 
query by substituting value v with the positions separated by OR and “> or ≥” with “=”. 
For instance, suppose we have an employee table, and it has a salary column that is 
partitioned into three PDs {(1000-5000), (5001-9000), (9001-12000)}. Assume that the 
bits’ positions are 32, 16, and 8, respectively. Suppose that the query is to find “salary 
> 8000”. Now the query condition is translated into “Reference &16>0 OR Reference 
&8>0”. Note that the PD that v is belongs to must be retrieved too with the PDs that 
must to be retrieved from the cloud, because the PDs are ranges. For the rest of the 
operation “< or ≤”, we treat them in a similar way as “> or ≥”, but by taking PDs that 
are less than or equal to v.  
In the second kind, the condition that contains only columns, the QM finds all PDs’ 
positions for every table involved in the condition. If the operation is “ = ”,  the QM 
rewrites  the  query condition by substituting the columns’ names with pairs (PDi from 
column A ꓥ PDi from column B, where PDi=PDj) of the DPs’ positions separated by 
the OR operation (pair1 V pair2 V pair3 …). To illustrate this, consider Table 1 (stu-
dents table) and assume that we have another table (students_info table) and both tables 
have the same data structure as in Fig.2. Suppose the condition is “where students.name 
= students_info.name”. Let’s say that,  
CT1 =  EAES-SIV (“Students”, SK)  
CT2 =  EAES-SIV (“students_info”, SK)  
We assume that the owner of the two tables is one who owns the SK. The translation 
will look like the following:  
“where ((CT1.Reference&524288>0 AND CT2.Reference&262144>0) OR 
(CT1.Reference&262144>0 AND CT2.Reference&131072>0) OR 
(CT1.Reference&131072>0 AND CT2.Reference &65536>0)  OR 
(CT1.Reference&65536>0 AND CT2.Reference &32768>0))” 
We do the same if the columns are numeric, and the operation sign is {>, <,  ≥,  ≤ }, 
where we arrange the pairs in a way to satisfy the order condition. 
In the third kind, the condition that contains more than one condition, each condition 
can be one of the above two kinds separated by AND or OR operations. Therefore, once 
all conditions are translated using the two translation methods, we need to combine the 
translation result with the AND or OR operation as in the query. For example, consider 
Table 1. Suppose the condition is (where Name = “Alice” OR Visa type = “J2”). This 
condition has two conditions with the OR operation, so the translation can be (where 
reference&524288>0 OR reference&128 >0). We perform the same method with the 
AND operation.  
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Table 2.   EAES-SIV (“Students”, SK), encrypted students table at the cloud. Note that the names 
of the columns are encrypted too using AES-SIV where ctn= EAES-SIV (“Name”, SK), ctr= EAES-SIV 
(“Rank”, SK), ctvt= EAES-SIV (“Visa type”, SK), ctd= EAES-SIV (“Department”, SK). 
ID ctn ctr ctvt ctd Reference 
110 *&^ *_^% */d ^%^H 10001000010000100000 
111 %^& /+$ &^/ &&%$ 00010100000100010000 
112 )(# %$/* +-*& )*#R 01000010000001001000 
113 $#! !@~K */f @$%* 00100001000010000010 
3.3 Relational Algebra Operators 
In this subsection, we describe the set of relational algebra operators the proposed 
model can support. Most previous studies focused on the select operation, and only a 
few considered other relation algebra operators, like aggregation, union, intersection, 
difference, sort, and duplicate elimination. This is because it is challenging to facilitate 
a model that can support all relational algebra over encrypted data. Therefore, to make 
the proposed model practical, we provide an algorithm to execute each operator, such 
that as much of the computation as possible is moved to the cloud provider, leaving 
minimal work for the QM. The proposed algorithms translate the queries in a way that 
they filter out only unrelated encrypted records. 
Select. The easiest way to implement the select operation over encrypted data is to 
retrieve the whole encrypted table from the cloud, decrypt it at the QM, and then exe-
cute the select operation on the data after they have been decrypted. However, this 
method is not practical in the case of huge tables, because it adds more computation 
burden on the QM. In an alternative method, in the proposed model, we move as much 
computation as possible to the cloud database server (CDBS) which has efficient com-
putation unites, so we aim to minimize the range of retrieved encrypted records as much 
as possible. This can be done as follows: The QM gets the user’s query and rewrites it 
according to tables’ data structures (DSs), and then sends the translated select query to 
the CDBS (note that the QM translates the clauses that involve only sensitive columns). 
Then the CDBS executes the translated query and sends back the result (encrypted tu-
ples for all candidate records). Now, the QM decrypts and applies the selection opera-
tion to them to filter unrelated data before returning the result to the user. We illustrated 
the process in the example in the previous sub-section (3.1). Algorithm 1 demonstrates 
the steps that are performed by the QM to execute the select operator. 
Join. To enable the proposed model to support the join operator, we must consider 
deferent cases for the join condition: 1) The join condition involves only non-sensitive 
columns, 2) the join condition involves only sensitive columns that have limited distinct 
values, and 3) the join condition involves sensitive columns that may have too many 
distinct values. The first case is straightforward, as the QM is required only to forward 
the query to the cloud database server (CDBS). Then it decrypts the result and removes 
the duplication.  
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Algorithm 1: Select operator 
1: Input < Table name, List of all columns, List of all data items di(s) > 
2: If none of columns ci mentioned in the query are sensitive 
3:     Forward the query to CDBS 
4:       Decrypt encrypted data 
      Send result back to the user 
5: If all column(s) ci mentioned in the query are sensitive 
6:     For each data item di / value v being searched for under column ci 
7: Find the bit’s position that mapped to the partition domain PD that di 
falls under in the table’s data structure DST. 
8: Rewrite the query and substitute values by bits’ positions. 
9: Send the translated query to CDBS to retrieve candidate tuples (CTs) 
10: Decrypt CTs then implement select again to filter out unrelated records. 
11: Send result back to the user 
  
 
In the second case, the QM uses the data structure DSs of the tables mentioned in 
the join condition to match the PDs of the tables. In Table T1, each PDj under a sensitive 
column SCi is joined with each PDj under a sensitive column SCi in Table T2 if and only 
if the PDj from T1 equals the PDj from T2. Note that the QM does this only for columns 
that are involved only in the join condition.  
The third case is based on range PDs. The QM joins the PDs from both tables, and 
it ensures that each PDi of the SC from Table T1 is joined with each PDi of the SC from 
Table T2 if DPi has at least one element that is common. For example, suppose we have 
two tables, Table A and Table B. We want to join them by the salary column. Suppose 
the salary DPs in Table A are [PD1 (10,000–15,000), PD2 (15,001–20,000), PD3 
(20,001–25,000), PD4 (25,001–30,000)], and for Table B are [PD1 (10,000–20,000), 
PD2 (20,001–30,000)]. The QM joins PD1 from Table B with PD1, PD2 from Table A 
because PD1 of Table B contains elements from both PD1 and PD2 of Table A, and so 
on. Then the QM rewrites the query and sends it to the cloud. The cloud returns the join 
result to the QM, which decrypts only the columns involved in the join condition, and 
checks whether the plain texts satisfy the join condition. Then the QM decrypts the 
whole tuple only if the two values satisfy the join condition. Otherwise, the QM skips 
to the next tuple. We do so to eliminate unnecessary decryption processes. The QM 
eliminates duplicates after finishing decrypting the whole result. Algorithm 2 shows the 
steps of the join operation. 
Aggregation. In this operation, we have two cases: First, the condition clause is based 
on column(s) where its partitions domain PDs values are not ranges. In this case, the 
CDBS efficiently implements the aggregation operation over encrypted data, and sends 
back the result to the QM, which needs only to decrypt the result and send it back to 
the user. Note that the QM may not implement the aggregation operator again over the 
decrypted data, because the candidate tuples retrieved from the CDBS are the exact 
query result.  
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For example, consider Table 1, Table 2, and Fig.2;  a query select count(*) from a 
student department where the department = “Computer science” is translated to “select 
count(*) from EAES-SIV(“Student”, SK) where reference &32 >0”, and it returns only the 
number of tuples that satisfy the condition, because the condition is based on the parti-
tion domain “computer science” that is not a range of values. The second case is the 
condition clause, which is based on column(s) where its partitions domains’ values are 
ranges. In this case, in addition to the first case, the QM implements the aggregation 
operator again over decrypted candidate tuples. This is because the candidate tuples 
have tuples unrelated to the query, as the PDs are ranges. In the average operation, we 
leave the whole calculation to be done at the QM. However, we minimize the range of 
encrypted records retrieved from the CDBS by only those that satisfy the condition 
clause of the average query. Algorithm 3 below illustrates the steps. 
 
Algorithm 2: Join operator 
1: Input < Tables names, List of all columns, List of all data items di(s) > 
2: If none of columns mentioned in the join condition are sensitive 
3:       Forward the query to CDBS 
4:        Decrypt encrypted data and Remove duplication 
       Send result back to the user 
5: If all columns mentioned in the query are sensitive 
6: If the SCs have limited distinct values  
7: Join the bit’s position of each partition domain PDi of a SCk from 
table Tm with the equivalent PDi of a SCx from table Tn  
8:      If the SCs have range values  
9: Join the bit’s position of each partition domain PDi of a SCk from table 
Tm with each PDi of a SCx from table Tn if it has at least 1 common 
value. 
10: Rewrite the query and substitute columns’ names by bits’ positions sepa-
rated by OR operation. 
11: Send the translated query to CDBS to retrieve candidate tuples (CTs) 
12: Decrypt CTs and Remove duplication 
13: Send result back to the user 
Sorting. Executing a sorting operator over encrypted data is not an easy process. How-
ever, in the proposed model, we can make the cloud server filter out unrelated records 
first according to the PDs of the data structure (DS). Then the QM decrypts the returned 
sorted result from the cloud and executes the sort operator over them again. The sorting 
computation needed from the QM before returning the final result to the user and after 
retrieving candidate tuples is significantly small, because the CDBS sends back only 
candidate records that fall under a certain partition domain(s). However, the CDBS will 
return a group of records that are not sorted except by partition domain. For example, 
to retrieve tuples that have income ranging from 50k to 60k, the cloud server returns all 
records that have income within this range unsorted, because they are encrypted. There-
fore, the QM sorts them after the decryption process. Algorithm 4 shows the processes.  
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Algorithm 4: Sort operator 
1: Do steps 1 to 14 from aggregation algorithm 
“Note that we need to substitute the term” aggregation” by “sort” 
  
Duplicate Elimination. In our model, to execute the duplicate elimination operator, 
we make the CDBS execute a selection query over encrypted data without duplication 
elimination keyword by just substituting the columns and values of the condition with 
the positions of the corresponding bits in the reference column. Then the QM selects 
distinct values before sending the results back to the user. For example, the query:  se-
lect distinct Name from students where department = “Computer science” is translated 
to:  select the name from EAES-SIV (“Student”, SK) where reference &32>0. The CDBS 
returns all encrypted names where the bit position 32 is set to 1 in the reference column. 
Then the QM implements the DISTINCT or DISTINCTROW keyword over the de-
crypted records to eliminate the duplication.  Algorithm 5 below shows the processes. 
 
Algorithm 5: Duplicate -Elimination operator 
1: Do steps 1 to 9 from select algorithm 
2: Decrypt encrypted data 
3: Execute Duplicate -Elimination operator again over the result 
4: Send result back to the user 
  
 
Algorithm 3: Aggregation operator 
1: Input < Tables names, List of all columns, List of all data items di(s) > 
2: If none of columns mentioned in the aggregation query are sensitive 
3:          Forward the query to CDBS 
4:               Decrypt encrypted data and Remove duplication 
              Send result back to the user 
5: If all columns mentioned in the query are sensitive 
6: Reconstruct the query by substituting data items/ values by the bits’ 
positions that mapped to the PDs that contain data items.  
7:    Send the query to CDBS 
8: If the SCs in the aggregation query are not ranges 
9:        Decrypt the result  
10:        Send result back to the user 
11: If the SCs in the aggregation query are ranges 
12:        Decrypt the result  
13:        Execute aggregation operator again over the result 
14:        Send result back to the user 
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Project. We can implement the project at the cloud database server (CDBS) by using 
the select operator. We cannot eliminate the duplication in the cloud; however, we can 
delay this step until the encrypted tuples arrive at the QM, which will be able to elimi-
nate duplicates after decrypting the cipher texts. Note that we do not retrieve all the 
encrypted tuples’ column values, as each column’s value is encrypted separately. In 
this case, we illuminate unnecessary decryption processes. Algorithm 6 illustrates the 
processes.  
 
Algorithm 6: Project operator 
1: Input < Tables names, List of all columns, List of all data items di(s) > 
2: If none of columns mentioned in the project query are sensitive 
3:      Forward the query to CDBS 
4:       Send result back to the user 
5: If all columns mentioned in the project query are sensitive 
6:          Forward the query to CDBS 
7:          Decrypt the result 
8:          If the term “DISTINCT” is present in the query 
9:                 Implement distinct over decrypted data 
10:          Send result back to the user 
           
Union. Before explaining how the proposed model performs the union operation over 
encrypted data, we discuss the two fundamental conditions of the union operation. First, 
all tables involved in the union operation must have the same number of columns. Sec-
ond, the domain of the ith column in Table A must be the same as the ith column in 
Table B. In the proposed model, the QM translates the union query, using the condition 
translation methods proposed in the previous section, to the CDBS. Then the CDBS 
implements the union operator, and it returns all tuples of both relations. Note that we 
cannot eliminate duplication in the cloud, because the PDs could have at least one PD 
as a range. For example, the first letter column for Name has four PDs {a-f, g-l, m-r, s-
z}, and we cannot remove the duplication before the decryption process. Therefore, we 
defer the removal of duplicates until after the encrypted tuples are decrypted by the 
QM. We assume that all tables are encrypted with the same encryption key, because if 
each table were encrypted with a different key, that would result in incorrect decryption. 
In algorithm 7, we show the steps.  
 
Algorithm 7: Union operator 
1: Input < Tables names> 
2: Forward the query to CDBS 
3: Decrypt the result of union query 
4: Implement distinct over decrypted data 
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Intersection. The intersection operation has the same two conditions as in the union 
operation. However, instead of retrieving all encrypted tuples of both tables (Table A 
and Table B), we retrieve only the tuples that are common to the tables. We must sim-
ulate the intersection operation, because it is impossible to apply it over encrypted tu-
ples. To do that, in the CDBS, we use the inner join between the two tables, where the 
join condition is based on PDs that are not ranges, as range-based PDs return more 
candidate tuples. Then the CDBS executes a query to choose the tuples from Table A 
that exist in the join result. After that, the CDBS returns the joining result to the QM, 
which eliminates duplicates after the decryption process. For example, suppose that 
Table A and Table B have attributes (Name, Visa type, Rank). Then we perform the 
inner join operation where the join condition is “visa type = visa type AND Rank= 
Rank). Note that, in the condition, we substitute the columns’ names with the positions 
of the corresponding bits to enable the CDBS to execute the operation. This filters out 
too many uncommon tuples in the cloud, which results in fewer decryption operations 
by the QM. Algorithm 8 below illustrates the processes.  
 
Algorithm 8: Intersection operator 
1: Input < Tables names> 
2: Find all common sensitive columns that are not ranges between the tables  
3: For each table Ti 
4: Find bits’ positions of PDs  
5: Initiates an inner join query where the joining condition is based on the 
equivalence of the bits obtained from step 4 for each table. 
6: Send the query to CDBS 
7: Decrypt the result of join. 
8: Implement distinct over decrypted data to Remove duplication 
9: Send result back to the user 
           
 
4 Implementation and Evaluation 
In this section, we describe how we implemented the proposed model and how we eval-
uated it. To implement the functions of the QM, we used Java to simulate each function 
in a class. The user submits a plain query to the QM, and the QM parses it, and rewrites 
it using predefined DSs. There is no need to modify the internals of the database, be-
cause the rewriting methods translate the users’ queries in ways that can be executed 
by the CDBS. We used the MySQL server on the user’s machine, and we used Java 
Database Connectivity (JDBC) as a connector from Java to MySQL. As a cloud, we 
created a MySql account at the university’s server to serve as the cloud database server 
(CDBS). 
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To evaluate the efficiency of the proposed model, we conducted different experiments 
in which we measure the time from a plain query is submitted until the result is returned 
to the user. In some experiments, we submit a query and find the percent of retrieved 
encrypted records. To accurately measure the efficiency, we compared the proposed 
model with a traditional database system in which the data were in plaintexts.  
In each experiment we performed, we ran queries on a table that held a certain num-
ber of records (10K and 20K,) where each table has six attributes (two of them are non-
sensitive, two are sensitive but not ranges, and two are sensitive but ranges). That 
helped us to evaluate our model and determine how the number of records affected the 
delay time. We tried different queries, with each query coming from the following set 
of queries: 
1) Join  
2) Aggregation (count, max, and min). 
3) Select where query conditions contain (one, two, and 3 clauses) 
Table 3 illustrates how our model dramatically drops the average of retrieved en-
crypted candidate records for a query. That means we successfully enable the cloud 
provider to process queries over encrypted data without decrypting them. We can notice 
that our model is more efficient when the query condition involves more clauses and 
the operation between the clauses is the AND. If the OR operation is present in the 
query condition, our model returns more candidate encrypted tuples because of the na-
ture of the OR operation. Moreover, if the condition contains sensitive columns that are 
ranges, our model will experience more candidate encrypted tuples to decrypt at the 
QM. That will add more delay because of the decryption processes and filtering out 
unrelated tuples from the result. 
Table 3. Average number of retrieved encrypted candidate tuples for different select query op-
erations and clauses. N.R denotes the number of records in a table. 
N.R 
Average number of retrieved encrypted candidate tuples from Cloud 
1 clause 2 clauses (AND) 
3 clauses 
(AND) 2 clauses (OR) 
3 clauses (OR) 
10K 2035 303 44 3408 6227 
20K 4758 583 96 7281 12106 
 
In Fig. 3, we compare the delay of our model and the delay of traditional database 
system TDBS (where data are not encrypted). We ran select queries where condition 
contains three clauses but with different operations, AND and OR. We can see that the 
delays when the AND operation is present in the condition is significantly small when 
compared with the delay when the OR operation is present in the condition. 
Fig. 4 shows the percent of encrypted records reprocessed at the QM after the de-
cryption in union and intersection operations. In the intersection, we found that our 
model filters out approximately 83 percent of uncommon encrypted tuples at the cloud, 
and only about 17 percent of the entire result was common. This is because we can’t 
eliminate the duplication at the cloud when we have range attributes, e.g. salary. Simi-
larly, in join and union, less than 30 percent of the results were filtered out at the QM. 
16 
According to this, we can say that our model efficiently reduces the delay that results 
from unnecessary decryption processes. 
In fig. 5, we can see that the execution time is neglectable when the aggregation 
query is based on sensitive columns that are not ranges. In such case, the QM doesn’t 
perform decryption; however, the QM will execute the aggregation query over de-
crypted data if the query is based on a range column, that is why we see the execution 
time is higher than the first case (non-range columns). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Delays in our model and how they are affected by the number of clauses and operations 
in a query condition.   
 
 
 
Fig. 4. The % of tuples reprocessed at the QM after decrypting the intersection, union, and join results. 
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Fig. 5. The execution time in ms for aggregation operators (count, max, and min) when the query 
condition has sensitive columns that are not ranges vs.  sensitive columns that are ranges. 
5 Conclusion  
Cloud computing is an attractive computing environment for all types of users and com-
panies. However, privacy breaches, not only by malicious attackers but also by curious 
providers, is the downside of such service, because users lose access control over out-
sourced data. Data encryption is an effective solution for this problem. However, 
searching over encrypted data is challenging, especially if a randomized encryption al-
gorithm is used for the encryption. In this research, we design a secure model to process 
queries and retrieve encrypted tuples from encrypted databases that preserve privacy 
and is efficient at the same time. The model is based on classifying columns as sensitive 
and non-sensitive, where only sensitive columns are encrypted. Furthermore, the table’s 
owner predefines the possible PDs and ranges for each sensitive column. Then for each 
table, we make a DS of the PDs, and create a bit vector whose length is equal to the 
number of PDs. We then map each PD to a specific bit where this bit is set to one if and 
only if the value of the corresponding column is equal or belongs to this PD. We use 
the bits to retrieve candidate tuples for a certain query that minimize the range of the 
retrieved encrypted tuples. The encrypted table in the cloud will have an additional 
column (the reference column) to store bit vectors. To make the model practical, we 
facilitate it to support most relational algebra operators. We performed different exper-
iments to test the efficiency of the model and found that it reduces the range of retrieved 
encrypted tuples to about 30 percent of the whole encrypted tuples in a table. 
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